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THE AUTHORITARIAN IMPULSE IN SEX
DISCRIMINATION LAW: A REPLY TO
PROFESSORS ABRAMS AND STRAUSS
Richard A. Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
The papers of Professors Kathryn Abrams' and David Strauss2
represent the stock responses to my basic position outlined in Gen-
der Is for Nouns.3 While both Professors Abrams and Strauss rec-
ognize that some reform of current antidiscrimination law might be
in order, they do not specify what shape such reform might take;
but, by the same token, they do reject as precipitate and unwise my
recommendation that the entire structure of the employment dis-,
crimination laws be dismantled, at least insofar as it applies to pri-
vate employers. I think that a careful consideration of their argu-
ments should lead the disinterested reader to the opposite
conclusion: that the case for keeping the sex discrimination law is
far weaker than even I had imagined.
In order to support this conclusion I shall consider four separate
topics raised by their two papers. The first is the nature and nurture
dispute, and its relationship to social policy. The second is the mean-
ing of that elusive term socially constructed. The third addresses
the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases, and the
fourth the relationship between an antidiscrimination norm and the
affirmative action principle. In this connection I also note the strik-
ing parallel between the arguments used in defense of the antidis-
crimination laws and those once used in defense of socialism more
generally.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I
should like to thank Jay Wright for his valuable and energetic research assistance in the prepara-
tion of this article.
1. Kathryn Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, And Reasonable Women: A Re-
sponse to Professor Epstein, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 1021 (1992).
2. David A Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1007
(1992).
3. Richard A. Epstein, Gender Isfor Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 981 (1992).
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I. NATURE AND NURTURE, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT THEM
Professors Abrams and Strauss both initially challenge the rela-
tionship between the nature and nurture distinction and the opera-
tion of employment markets. My basic position was, and is, that if
men and women on some systematic basis bring different attributes
to the employment market, then we should expect to find a volun-
tary sorting by position, and within firms, that reflects underlying
concerns with productivity, and not the invidious operation of some
system of social or employer exploitation.'
The initial counterargument to this position offered by Strauss is
that the relevant line of distinction is not that between nature and
nurture, but the distinction between those changes in behavior that
are hard to make and those that are easy to make. It is possible, he
notes, that biological differences will fall as easily into the category
of changes easy to make as they will into changes difficult to make,
and that environmental differences (one need think only of disabili-
ties brought on by accidents) will be difficult to overcome.5 There
are in effect four possible cells: biological/difficult to change, biolog-
ical/easy to change, environmental/difficult to change, and environ-
mental/easy to change. Professor Strauss's criticism, and it is surely
true, is that none of these cells are empty. His illustration of near-
sightedness as a biological change easily corrected by glasses (one
wishes that it were always so simple!) is treated as evidence of the
irrelevance of the nature-nurture distinction.
His whole enterprise is misguided because of what it fails to es-
tablish. The issue here is not whether all four cells are filled-they
surely are. Instead a whole range of questions are relevant: one is
whether the first' cell, biological/difficult to change, is
empty-which it surely is not. In order to defeat the thrust of my
basic argument it is not sufficient for Strauss to show that there are
multiple causes of the behavioral and attitudinal differences between
men and women. He must use this new information to deny that
there are any sex-linked characteristics, biological in origin, that
could prove important in employment markets. The evidence of the
major differences, while often difficult to appreciate and difficult to
change, has been documented far more exhaustively than in my ini-
4. See id. at 995; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS chs. 13-14 (1992).
5. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1008-09.
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tial paper, and nothing that either he or Professor Abrams says un-
dercuts their importance.6 IQ tests, for example, show strong sex-
linked characteristics, even if the median scores are the same for
males and females: The indices have been so defined that the persis-
tent differences between the sexes-differences that cut in both di-
rections-are made to even out.7 It is not possible to ignore these
differences simply because other differences should be taken into ac-
count. And they are more relevant for this inquiry precisely because
they, and not environmental differences, bear on the question of
whether market behaviors are subject to biological influences. The
presence of multiple sources of sex differences only shows how diffi-
cult it is for crude regulatory schemes to impose intelligent controls
over market behavior.
Professor Strauss has yet another line of defense, namely that the
two relevant questions in the nature-nurture controversy are, What
are the costs of overcoming natural differences? and, What is the
moral case for overcoming them? In this his concern is echoed by
Professor Abrams who attacks any "unreflective association of the
'natural' with the normative." 8 But these two questions are not
wholly separate from the question of the magnitude of the biological
differences: If they are large, then we now have explanations from
the employee side of the market as to why men and women tend to
pursue different career paths. It is therefore far more difficult to
make out the common claim that discrimination against women is
based on invidious or irrational forces. Instead it becomes more
plausible to argue that the discrimination between men and women
works to the advantage of both. If one root of occupational differ-
ences is biological, then we cannot treat these differences as the
fault of any group whom the law should seek to punish or even cor-
rect. Instead there is strong confirmation that the social costs of
their "correction" will be great because the preferences in question
are both powerful and ingrained.
The biological evidence should be relevant therefore even under
6. For an exhaustive summary, see Kingsley R. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law. The
Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differences, 38 Sw. L.J. 617 (1984).
7. See id. at 621-22; LEE WILLERMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DIFFER-
ENCES 388 (1979).
8. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1027. As for the basic philosophical point, I need only repeat one
sentence from my earlier paper: "The judgment of whether certain acts are, or should be, allowa-
ble is in the end always social, no matter what one's view of human nature." Epstein, supra note
3, at 994.
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the current disparate treatment standard, which, as Professor
Strauss tells us, allows differences in outcomes to survive in the
marketplace "so long as gender was not in any way the basis of the
employer's actions." In contrast, "[t]he disparate impact standard
does impose some limits on outcomes, but subject to a business ne-
cessity defense; that is the employer need not equalize outcomes if it
would be too costly to do so.' '1 ° In both these cases, biological evi-
dence will have a role to play. Where there are biological differences
in preferences by employees, the mere fact of employee preference
negates the plaintiff's evidence that sex was "the," or even "a," ba-
sis in the employment practices. And where biological differences
are substantial, it shows the costliness of steps necessary to over-
come them, although rarely to the level of business necessity' as the
law is commonly construed today.
In light of the pervasive nature of the cost question, it is difficult
to imagine any moral theory holding that the greater the natural
differences between men and women, the more that should be done
to root them out from employment settings. Instead the demand for
social reconstruction, like the demand for anything else, should de-
crease as the cost of the proposed changes increases. Professor
Strauss's recourse to the importance of collective decisions does
nothing to offer any justification for his program. The very existence
of sex differences offers the potential for gains from trade for both
men and women, and the insistence that these differences be over-
come by an antidiscrimination law does not explain why anyone
should favor a legal reform that leaves both groups worse off than
they would have been if market forces had been allowed to operate
in job selection.
To be sure, Professor Strauss makes the predictable response that
9. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1015. This summary simplifies the basic issues because it ignores
the many cases of joint and mixed motivation, where the law is far more complex. See generally
Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed-Motive Dis-
crimination, 68 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1990). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarifies the burden each
party bears in mixed-motive cases. To make out a violation, a plaintiff must establish that an
employer's decision was motivated by one of Title VII's forbidden criteria (sex, race, etc.). Once a
violation is established, the employer may limit the plaintiffis relief by showing that its decision
would have been the same even without the presence of the forbidden factor. Pub. L. No. 102-166,
§ 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(B) (1988 & Supp.
I1 1991)).
10. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1015. His version of the defense takes much of the sting out of the
present law, which often distinguishes business necessity from mere convenience, setting therefore
a very high threshold for cost justifications.
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we cannot rely on markets to correct the initial errors in distribu-
tion, if such there be. 1 But in so doing he misses the familiar and
decisive reply. Even if the initial distribution is suspect, nothing is
gained by preventing voluntary exchanges that work Pareto im-
provements. At best his argument calls for a one-time lump sum
transfer payment from men to women, or perhaps even for a differ-
ential rate of taxation on men's and women's income to reflect the
inequity'that he perceives in the initial position. But I doubt that he
could defend either proposition on its own terms, especially since the
various forms of government regulation often work capricious redis-
tributions within classes (that is, from some women to other
women), no matter what their ostensible intentions. It is one thing
to insist that there are moral and normative issues that must be
taken into account once factual differences are identified. It is quite
another thing to show that these differences justify the complex and
costly set of antidiscrimination laws that are now on the books. For
all his insistence on the moral point, Strauss offers us no argument
on the factual issues.
Professor Strauss also pursues another theme: He contends that
the existence of unregulated employment markets create negative
externalities sustained by the victims of discrimination. Here in ef-
fect the position is that discrimination should be regarded as a tort,
akin perhaps to the tort of assault,'2 because of the harm that it
does to "women's self-respect, social status, and freedom from de-
pendency."' 3 The response is odd for a set of laws that treat women
as a protected class, with the implication that they cannot make it
on their own in the workplace. To speak the language of "indepen-
dent income or employment opportunities"' 4 is to use libertarian
language to support a statute that constitutes the very antithesis of
11. "The well-known problem with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is that it is not plausible as a
standard for evaluating the justice of social institutions generally. The principal reason is that it
ignores distributional concerns." Id. at 1016.
12. He takes this position explicitly in David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial
Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991).
The analytical differences between an assault and a private refusal to deal, for whatever reason,
are developed at length in EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 29-31. His piece argues for nationwide quotas
in all occupations-a disastrous prescription that promises to bring the entire economy to a grind-
ing halt. Cf. John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights
Policy, 79 GEo. UJ. 1713, 1734 (1991) (criticizing Prof. Strauss's quota proposal on the ground
that it is based on a view of race discrimination wholly lacking in empirical support).
13. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1016.
14. Id. at 1017.
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self-sufficiency and freedom of opportunity. One can quite agree
that these indirect effects and soft externalities should be taken into
account. But if so, then they all should be counted, including the
demoralization effects that the antidiscrimination laws have on
groups who are disadvantaged by them. In principle, it should be
shown that the control of these negative externalities is so important
that it outweighs the economic inefficiencies, demoralization costs,
and administrative costs brought on by Title VII. Professor Strauss
not only fails to do this, he fails even to show that his ragtag collec-
tion of soft externalities, taken together, cut in his favor.
Professor Abrams pursues this same theme, but in a discussion of
my brief treatment of breastfeeding, 15 which was only designed to
note that the relative abilities and preferences of men and women
differ in both the family and employment sphere. She is correct to
point out that today women can avail themselves of many substi-
tutes for breastfeeding, and that there is no reason at all for women
to chain themselves to their children if they wish to do otherwise.'
But she does not understand that evolutionary pressures continue to
exert their influences today, even if the circumstances that gener-
ated these pressures have long since passed from the scene. Of
course Professor Abrams is correct in insisting that freedom of
choice in styles of parenting is something that any open society
should protect. But what is wholly missing from Professor Abrams'
account is the recognition that any woman would want to alter her
professional life in order to breast feed, as many do. Nor does she
think it possible that the set of emotions that lead some women to
breast feed might influence the behavior and sentiments of other
women who decide to forgo or curtail that opportunity in order to
return to the workplace. She has a far too rigid and compartmental-
ized view of the mainsprings of human behavior. Once the patterns
of parent bonding, which begin before birth, differ between men and
women, then we should expect on average that they will have differ-
ent attachments to the workplace. I take it (without citation) that
the number of women lawyers who decide to leave or cut back on
their careers, either permanently or temporarily, to nurse or to raise
their children is very large. I regard these as perfectly responsible
and laudable choices, although obviously not the only ones that can
be made. The initial argument in the paper is therefore sound: Dif-
15. Epstein, supra note 3, at 990.
16. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1024-25.
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ferences in natural endowment will lead to differences in employ-
ment behaviors. We should not expect matters to be otherwise. 17
Professor Abrams fears that I enjoy covert membership in that
hardy band of sociobiologists "who begin with Darwin and 'extrapo-
late from the species to the individual and from physical character-
istics to psychological ones.' ",18 But test my position against her cri-
teria. I have not made the leap from the group to the individual.
Instead I have said that in large populations, systematic differences
between men and women will occur, which is surely consistent with
some men having a greater preference for nurturing activities than
most women, even if the norm is the other way. And I am quite
willing to insist with Darwin and the modern sociobiologists that the
theory of natural selection applies to the emotions and other psycho-
logical states with as much force as they do to physical characteris-
tics. Does anyone think that the emotion of fear is designed to bring
us closer to objects that cause our destruction? Or that it has no
survival value in stimulating either defense or flight? It would be a
truly amazing world if Professor Abrams were correct and psycho-
logical states were utterly independent of biological influences.
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION: DOES ANYONE KNOW
WHAT IT MEANS?
Professors Abrams and Strauss also take me to task for my attack
on the common assertion made by feminists and others that social
reality is often socially constructed. In part they are uneasy about
pursuing this line of attack because they are uncertain themselves
exactly what the phrase means-which is a good reason to avoid it
in one's own work. In my view, the words mean exactly what they
say: constructed is used in opposition to found or discovered, so that
differences between men and women are thus made. But by whom?
Socially suggests that it is through a collective pattern of accultura-
tion in which we all participate, for which we are all in some sense
responsible, and which is not seriously constrained by biological ele-
ments. Socially constructed is thus used in opposition to "either
17. For a more extensive development of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, The Varieties of
Self-Interest, 8 SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 102 (1990).
18. Abrams, supra note 1, at 1025 (quoting CYTHNIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINC-
TIONS: SEX. GENDER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 47 (1988j (citing CAROL TAVRIS & CAROLE WADE.
THE LONGEST WAR: SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1984))). The target of this criti-
cism is EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE (1978).
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mirroring or being determined by nature." 9
The clear implication of this position is that since we do not like
the reality that we see-because it places men in dominant positions
over women-then we should take conscious and purposive steps to
reshape that reality in a new collective image. In part those changes
could come through alteration of traditional habits of interaction,
which, if done without the coercive power of the state, may be all
for the good-so long as all of us are entitled to urge that form of
social conduct that we regard as appropriate. But for the defenders
of Title VII social persuasion, "open to all" is not good enough. In
their view it becomes possible and necessary to use the force and
might of the state to reconstruct society to conform with their views
of what is morally and socially just. The authoritarian impulse that
lurks behind the conception, and its dangerous consequences, are not
softened by its benevolent motive.
Both Professors Abrams and Strauss protest my stark characteri-
zation of socially constructed. Professor Strauss, for his part, gives
the term a meaning that drains it of all its punch: "The term 'so-
cially constructed', as I understand it, means not that the character-
istics in question are literally created by society but that the deci-
sion what to do about them is one that society can make."20 On this
question of usage, his innocuous interpretation stands quite alone.
Out of curiosity I had run a LEXIS search of the Harvard Law
Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the University of Chicago Law
Review for the past several years on the words socially constructed.
Not one instance of those found bears any resemblance to Professor
Strauss's peculiar definition of the phrase.
Here is a brief sampling. The late Mary Jo Frug in the Harvard
Law Review: "Most feminists are committed to the position that
however 'natural' and common sex differences may seem, the differ-
ences between women and men are not. biologically compelled; they
are, rather, 'socially constructed.' "2 Vicki Schultz in the Harvard
Law Review.- "[T]he story portrays gender as so complete and natu-
ral as to render invisible the processes through which gender is so-
cially constructed by employers."22 Cass Sunstein in the Harvard
1
19. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1240 (1987).
20. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1011.
21. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARv. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1992).
22. Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
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Law Review: "MacKinnon claims that gender relations, like the
common law and racial practices, are regarded as natural or pre-
political but are actually socially constructed, alterable, and un-
just. '2 3 And again by Sunstein: "MacKinnon responds that sexual-
ity is to a large degree socially constructed for both men and
women."2 4 Frances E. Olson in the Harvard Law Review: "By 'gen-
der system' I mean the system wherein male and female are socially
constructed as correlative opposites that form a dichotomy in which
males are hierarchically superior to females."25 Robin West in the
University of Chicago Law Review: "The longing [in men] to over-
come alienation is a socially constructed reaction against the natural
fact of individuation. 26 Mari J. Matsuda in the Yale Law Journal:
"The way in which linguistic patterns are seen as natural rather
than socially constructed is evident in judicial opinions. 27 Nancy
Ehrenreich in the Yale Law Journal: "Pornography is simply the
most obvious example of a whole range of mechanisms through
which women are socially constructed as sexual objects."2 And so
on.
Professor Strauss's usage is the clearly aberrant. On one reading,
however, it is wholly harmless, because even persons who believed
that all personality traits are biologically determined could insist
that the question of social responses to biological differences are al-
ways subject to human deliberation. His further assertion suggests
that something more ominous is afoot: The use of the term is not
designed to negate the fact of biological differences, rather "it is to
assert that the social significance of those differences is something
that is ultimately subject to collective decision." 2 9 But why? Given
this definition, we have here an utterly untested and unjustified case
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103
HARV. L. Rtv. 1749, 1805 (1990).
23. Cass R. Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARv. L. REV. 826, 829-30 (1988)
(book review). The connection between the biological and the alterable should be evident.
24. Id. at 843.
25. Frances E. Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1572 n.274 (1983).
26. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 41 (1988).
27. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurispru-
dence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1394 n.229 (1991).
28. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1197 n.75 (1990).
29. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1011 (emphasis added). It is worth noting that every user of the
term is to the left of center on the question of markets versus regulation, at least in areas where
they think that social construction applies.
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for massive social thought control that is utterly inconsistent with
any respect for freedom of speech, religion, or conscience. Unfortu-
nately, Professor Strauss does not explore any of the implications of
his chilling general statement about the importance of right think-
ing, but instead lapses off into an innocuous example which says
that the fact that men are stronger and more aggressive could in
certain situations be a liability instead of an asset. And so it is, on
any theory, including a libertarian theory that calls for a prohibition
on the use of force and respect for freedom of association.
Professor Strauss also takes a different tack and notes that femi-
nists often fall into two camps: those who reject the idea that there
are any important sex differences and those who insist that these
"real differences" matter. I am of course aware of these two strands
of thought, and wish only to point out the unfortunate trend in the
social dialogue. Persons like myself are not supposed to point out sex
differences in order to argue on behalf of open markets. But femi-
nists are allowed to point out these differences, either to claim the
moral superiority of women or, in the alternative, as a justification
for certain social interventions that will offset any natural disadvan-
tages they suffer. It thus becomes a "can't lose" situation for them
and a "can't win" situation for everyone else. The list of authors
quoted above surely contains no friend of free markets in matters
where social construction controls.
Professor Abrams follows the general pattern of believers in social
construction. She acknowledges her own coercive agenda of legal en-
forcement. In her view, it is important to recognize the limits of
"equality" theory, which has treated discrimination as episodic and
irrational, and which therefore has concentrated on opening up the
workplace to women.30 In her view, that form of intervention has
proved insufficient because it "fails to address those forms of dis-
crimination that arise from neglect or devaluation of women's differ-
ences. '"31 Now the effort is to overcome entrenched attitudes, to
compensate for differences in parenting style and the like. I have not
the slightest doubt that self-interested employers will have strong
incentives to accommodate the differences between men and women
on mutually beneficial terms if freed from the shackles of Title VII.
But Professor Abrams, true to her own authoritarian impulses, re-
gards voluntary adjustments as insufficient for her task. Instead the
30. Abrams, supra note I, at 1029-30.
31. Id. at 1030.
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law must now be used as a weapon to force employers to "accommo-
date women, not simply admit them.""a She then launches into a
comprehensive statement about the programs that she thinks might
achieve this goal without once asking whether or how a system of
government ukases can do better than a system of voluntary
arrangements.
To mention but one example, she writes: "A statute requiring ma-
ternity leave, for example, might contain legislative history describ-
ing the importance of family in the lives of many women, the costs
of work/family conflict for workers who are mothers, or the preva-
lence of mothers as primary care providers.""3 But hers is a bad
legislative history in support of a bad statutory idea. It ignores all
the costs that might be inflicted on employers who have to make do
with temporary substitutes during a period of absence, and who are
thus left far worse off than they would otherwise be, even when the
woman takes an unpaid leave. Professor Abrams also ignores the
loss of opportunities for other women who want to return to the
workplace and find their opportunities blocked by women who have
safe positions under the statute. And she overlooks the obvious fact
that many firms are, without any statute, willing to give voluntary
maternity leave to many women. Her insistence that a maternity
leave program is a good idea waiting for enactment tells us all too
clearly what socially constructed means: massive coercion by the
state in support of dubious schemes of social control that could
never earn their place in an open market.
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN
The last portion of Professor Abrams' paper is not directed to-
wards the arguments I made in Gender Is for Nouns, but instead
deals with the general issue of sexual harassment, on which she has
previously written.34 These earlier writings took the position that
sexual harassment cases should be evaluated from the perspective of
the reasonable woman, and how she should be expected to respond
to behavior by a sometime unreasonable male. That position, which
rejects both the perspective of the reasonable man and the reasona-
ble person, has been adopted in at least one judicial opinion, which
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1031.
34. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms. 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1989).
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cited Professor Abrams' work., 5 Now Professor Abrams rightly has
some uneasiness with her position. It is not that she wishes to return
to the earlier standards that contain what she perceives as a male
bias. It is that she thinks her own standard might well contain bias
in favor of white, middle-class, heterosexual women, as opposed to
working-class women, lesbians, and women of other races and col-
ors, for whom the standards of acceptable conduct might be
different.
I have no doubt that Professor Abrams is correct to be uneasy
about her earlier position, for there is no evident reason why a single
standard of sexual harassment should fit all cases, given the enor-
mous variation in situations to which that standard has to apply.
But Professor Abrams does not take her skepticism quite far
enough. The variation that she sees among the classes of women
also carries over to the classes of firms in which they work, and the
appropriate standards of conduct for them. An employer has all the
incentives to set the right standards for each workplace. If the stan-
dards are made too stringent, then honest workers, fearing false
charges, will shy away from the firm; if they are made too lax, then
able women will choose to work elsewhere. There are no externali-
ties in this setting, and no reason to believe that a single dictate
imposed by the courts or under Title VII will begin to be serviceable
in the many contexts to which it applies. Again a contract solution
is superior to a regulatory one, whether it allows for compensatory
damages or administrative relief. Professor Abrams' good common
sense allows her to see the difficulties in her earlier work, but her
regrettable bent toward statist solutions forces her to miss the
proper solution to what has been, and will doubtless remain, an im-
portant social problem.
IV. NONDISCRIMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Professor Strauss also takes this occasion to raise another theme
to which he has a great partiality.3 6 He argues that there is really
35. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). Ellison illustrates some of the difficul-
ties in the coordination of Title VII with ordinary labor law. The plaintiff's co-employee, Gray, at
the IRS was initially transferred to another office after the plaintiff had filed her grievances about
the "weird" notes and letters that Gray had sent her. But the co-employee filed a union grievance
and was ordered reinstated at his initial office on condition that he not "bother" the plaintiff.
Management in a nonunion environment is clearly better able to respond to harassment claims
than management that is so constrained.
36. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1019.
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no ironclad distinction between the antidiscrimination principle and
the affirmative action principle. If therefore there is widespread ac-
ceptance of the first (and there is no doubt that there is), then like-
wise there is no legitimate ground on which to oppose the second.
Just as the obligation to avoid discrimination can be imposed under
the present law by government edict, the same is true of affirmative
action programs. The full regime of the modern civil rights move-
ment is therefore faithful to the original promise of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.
Professor Strauss here tries to win an important social debate by
a slippery form of deductive argument, not worthy of the traditional
Oxford Ordinary-Language philosopher. But his point simply will
not work once the ambiguity in the idea of the nondiscrimination
principle is laid bare. As I argued in Gender. Is for Nouns, the origi-
nal defenders of the antidiscrimination laws were confident in their
judgment about the efficacy of the antidiscrimination laws. They be-
lieved that they could eat their cake and have it too. In their view,
the market was pervaded with irrational excesses that distinguished
on grounds of race, and by implication, on grounds of sex as well.
They believed that it was possible to remove these excess influences
from the employment process, and thereby allow decisions based on
merit to come to the fore. They had before them the precedent of
the Equal Pay Act of 1963,11 which enshrined into statute the idea
of equal pay for equal work, whose soundness remains an article of
faith for the vast number of Americans of all political parties and
persuasions.
These early developments in civil rights law were not pleas for
disguised subsidies for women in the workplace. Could one imagine
any advocate of the Equal Pay Act defending the statute on that
ground in 1963? Or even today? And could anyone imagine a de-
fense of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the ground that it gave
hidden subsidies to protected classes-itself a conception that only
worked its way into the literature long after Title VII went into
effect in 1965. Although no one thought about the question at all,
imagine anyone defending the statute on the grounds of justice and
claiming the following: Workers of groups A and B both produce
value of 100. The collateral costs to the employer (equipment, insur-
ance, morale, etc.) for members of group A are 80, and the collat-
37. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
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eral costs to the employer for members of group B are 60. Therefore
the wages of the two groups, if identical, should be 30 (100-70). If
those wages were calculated separately, those of the men should be
40 and of the women 20 for the firm to be indifferent between them.
Surely the subsidy of A by B is clear, and the correct definition of
discrimination requires some differential wage (equal here to 20) to
offset the differential collateral costs. Markets will tend to make
those adjustments, which regulators will systematically suppress, as
they now do under current law. Once this grotesque, cost-free defini-
tion of discrimination is treated as the principle enshrined in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, then of course affirmative action involves
the same principle as nondiscrimination. One gives a subsidy by ig-
noring differential costs, and the other (in its pure form at least)
gives higher wages or other preferences to the members of group B
when their productivity is no greater than that of group A. The two
principles of differential costs and differential benefits can of course
be mixed and matched at our pleasure, so long as we know what
they entail: equal wages for unequal work, and unequal wages for
equal work.
Strauss's topsy-turvy world is a far cry from the original concep-
tion of the antidiscrimination principle, and for all I know there
may be many firms that profit from its adoption. But his program
that equates nondiscrimination and affirmative action is not a pro-
gram for voluntary action. It is a program of public coercion, based
on little more than a regrettable verbal equivocation in the meaning
of the term discrimination. His misguided cleverness should give us
pause to believe that any legislative or judicial commitment to com-
bat discrimination in the workplace could be faithful to its own mis-
sion. The beneficiaries of a sex-blind standard in employment dis-
crimination will abandon it at the drop of a hat when it no longer
provides them an advantage. There is no stable political equilibrium
to support any "blind" antidiscrimination principle, and enacting
any such principle into law will only lead to the present double stan-
dard, whereby government seeks endlessly to combat all forms of
discrimination, real or imagined, against its favored groups, while
actively forcing or inducing discrimination in their favor.
V. CONCLUSION
This constant expansion of government roles in employment mar-
kets should be understood for what it is-another effort to manage
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an economy from the center. Nearly fifty years ago, in the Road to
Serfdom, a8 the late and great Friedrich von Hayek warned against
the "fatal conceit" of central planning of the economy. The center
can never get enough information to make intelligent choices and
comparisons of resource use. He spoke of this issue in the grand
context of socialism when it was understood not merely as some af-
firmation of certain welfare rights-housing, health, education, and
the like-for all citizens, but, more boldly, as the collective owner-
ship of the means of production. The employment discrimination
laws do not purport to make the government the sole employer of all
workers, but they do seek to establish a single set of contract terms
for all employment relationships. It is a large slice of central plan-
ning, with regulation as the hidden proxy for government ownership.
It is, I think, more than a mere historical curiosity to watch the
parallel evolution in the arguments in favor of an extensive govern-
ment role, first in the control of the means of production and now in
employment regulation. The early socialists thought that socialism
could eliminate the wasteful aspects of market competition and lead
to a system that produced greater material satisfaction for its citi-
zens. The moral premise behind the system was, however odd it
might seem today, a kind of wealth or utility maximization. The
abject failures of the program in practice has led its European de-
fenders to abandon the system and to work for a belated transfor-
mation to some (qualified) market system. But the American social-
ists have not learned the lesson. So they continue to defend a system
of extensive government intervention on the ground that it is neces-
sary to overcome inequalities of wealth within society, -to provide
basic minimum rights-education, welfare, health care-that mar-
kets supposedly cannot provide. The defenses are rarely based on
the productive efficiency of any government system: Distributional
questions, psychological concerns, and dignitary benefits lie at the
root of their argument.
The civil rights movement has witnessed a similar scaling down of
its expectations. The rhetoric of the 1960s was the rhetoric of equal-
ity of opportunity and economic progress; it was the rhetoric of a
system confident that it could beat the market at its own game by
unleashing the productive forces of society that had been kept in
check too long by ignorance and prejudice. But what Hayek said
38. FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK,.THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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about central planning in the round also applies to central planning
in employment markets. Now that it has become clear that the civil
rights laws cannot achieve those lofty ends, that we live in an age of
limits and economic anxiety, the rationales for them have shifted to
reflect the new set of reduced expectations. We are told that these
laws advance individual dignity, that they subsidize worthy recipi-
ents and protected classes, and that they guarantee minimum rights.
No mind that they will fail in these more modest tasks as they
failed in their original and grander mission. The elaborate rhetoric
of social reconstruction and self-realization, of marginalization and
devaluation, will pour forth in vast quantities to support a legal pro-
gram that at its root has become yet another authoritarian exercise,
another botched and misguided form of central planning. We may
not be able to stem the rhetoric, but we should repeal, and repeal
now, the statutes that have become the focal point of the authorita-
rian intellectual mindset represented by Professors Abrams and
Strauss.
1056 [Vol. 41:1041
